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Abstract— South China Sea has become an area where 
power politics continue to play out in each passing day. 
Though, there have not been the use of force by any 
claimant, the intense nature of the dispute is exacerbated 
by the power politics between China and United States. 
The dispute is between six states — China, Brunei, 
Malaysia, Vietnam, Philippines and Taiwan, with China 
and Taiwan the only non- Association of South East Asian 
(ASEAN) members. The dispute and the power politics 
are not unconnected with the strategic, economic and 
political significance of the sea to not only the claimants 
but non-claimants like United States. At the centre of the 
dispute is China with its nine-dash line claims which 
encompass all the islands — the Spratlys, the Paracels, 
the Pratas and the Macclesfield Bank. As a regional 
grouping with committed responsibilities, this paper 
interrogates ASEAN’s role in the dispute and argues that 
there is a large divide that affects the potency and 
masculinity of ASEAN to act; a divide that is caused by 
intra-ASEAN disjoint and incursion of United States. 
China is at the centre of the causes of the divide. 
Sufficiently relying on the existing related literatures 
(secondary sources) for proper analysis with empirical 
data in form of tables, the paper recommends that ASEAN 
needs to recalibrate and reinvent itself by forging a 
common bond against China after reconciling their 
overlapping claims, reconstructing the provisions of, and 
strengthening the enforcements of Declaration of Conduct 
of Parties (DOC), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and 
East Asia Summit (EAS).  
Keywords— ASEAN, China, South China Sea, U.S., 
DOC,  ARF. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
South China Sea is one of the most, if not the most 
contentious and disputatious territorial and maritime 
issues in contemporary times and the most entangling in 
the Asian continent. As Taylor Fravel rightly captures it, 
“no international maritime dispute has garnered more 
attention than the contest over the islands, reefs and 
waters of the South Chna Sea” (Fravel, 2011:292). The 
dispute involves six states:  China, Brunei, Malaysia, 
Vietnam, Philippines and Taiwan with overlapping claims 
to territorial sovereignty and maritime rights over the 
control of all or some of the Spratly Islands, the Paracel 
Islands, the Pratas Islands and the Macclesfield Bank 
which encompass over hundreds islands, reefs and banks 
throughout the South China Sea. 
These islands are hotly contested due to their strategic, 
political and economic significance to the claimants and 
non-claimants like United States. As Barry Buzan asserts 
that the “dramatic rise in the realizable economic value of 
oceans and the rapid spread of sovereign states to cover 
virtually all land areas are reasons to explain why oceans 
have become areas of intense competition for scarce 
goods” in Andy (2011). These myriads and congregation 
of interests from both claimants and non-claimants further 
leave ASEAN in a divide as to how best to tackle and 
resolve the dispute even in the face of commendable 
mechanisms marshaled it marshaled aimed at reducing 
and diffusing tensions in the region. Likewise, these 
mechanisms have not also translated into pacifying an 
aggressive and assertive China whose claims incubate all 
the islands in the sea as captured in its nine-dash line. As 
a regional grouping hailed for its maintenance of cohesion 
and stability since its inception in 1967, ASEAN’s 
nightmare, at least recently, is how best to re-establish 
and re-strengthen the ASEAN Way which has been 
incapacitated and torn apart by ASEAN internal disjoint 
and foreign incursion of U.S. 
The ASEAN divide can be pictured from two sources: the 
intra-ASEAN disjoint and United States’ incursion where 
China is the reason for the both. The intra-ASEAN 
disjoint is caused by the fear of some of the ASEAN 
members of risking economic interdependence between 
them and China coupled with China’s military power 
thereby negatively affecting the prospects of forging  a 
common bond against China, the first ASEAN divide. 
Secondly, the incursion by U.S into the region further 
leaves ASEAN confused and inane as ASEAN members 
divide on whether U.S presence in the region should be 
indispensable or not, the second ASEAN divide. 
Candidly, the implication of these divides is the elusive 
peace in the region. It is in the light of these 
complicated and complex situations confronting ASEAN 
as a unit that this paper asks these questions: what 
attempts has ASEAN made vis-à-vis South China Sea 
dispute and how successful are they within the context of 
ASEAN divide? To what extent has U.S incursion in the 
region undermined the ASEAN unity? What can ASEAN 
do to amicably resolve the dispute and regain its 
prominence as a viable regional grouping without 
upsetting its members, China and U.S? In attempts to 
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address these questions, the paper is sectionalized into 
five. The first section explicates briefly the history and 
geography of South China Sea. Sections two and three 
capture the claims of the various disputants and what is at 
stake in the South China Sea respectively. While section 
four explains the first phase of ASEAN divide as 
ASEAN’s internal disjoint, section five pigeon-holes the 
second phase of ASEAN divide as U.S. incursion into the 
region. Section six concludes the entire argument leaving 
behind useful recommendations that will reinvigorate a 
weakened ASEAN. 
 
South China Sea: The Historical and Geographical 
Audit 
The South China Sea was before now, an abandoned area 
that states were not interested in due to how dangerous the 
region was claimed to be prior to World War II. Today, it 
has become a region where different theories have been 
formulated to explain the geography, significance, claims 
and interests of the claimants and non-claimants like 
United States. South China Sea lies in the south east of 
the Asian continent. It also encapsulates part of the pacific 
ocean stretching from Singapore and the Strait of Malacca 
in the southwest (Monique, 2000). Furthermore, South 
China Sea contains a large expanse of water totaling 
648,000 square miles from Luzon Strait in the north to the 
Malacca Strait in the south (Schofield and Prescott, 1985). 
Inside this water are thousands of islands, that include 
rocks, islets, reefs and low-tide elevations, which are fully 
submerged at high tide.  
Beyond that, South China Sea contains islands which 
include Spratlys, Paracels, Macclessfields and the Pratas. 
These islands contain over 250 islands, atolls, cays, 
shoals, reefs and sandbars (Bautista, 2007). South China 
Sea was first occupied by France in the 1930s and later 
was handed over to Japan after the World War II. As a 
result, South China Sea was included into Japanese 
administrative system. At the end of the war, Japan left 
the region unoccupied. Since then, South China Sea has 
become “the mother of all territorial disputes” (Baviera, 
2004:205).  
The Spratlys are located between 4∘ and 11∘ 3 ∕ north 
latitude and 109∘ 30 ∕ and 117∘ 50 ∕ east longitude.  Though, 
the Spratlys are too small for human support and 
settlement, they contain fresh water and other land-based 
resources which make the islands significant to the 
disputants (Joyner, 1999).  The Paracels are located 
between 15∘ 46 ′ and 17∘ 109′ north and between 111∘ 11′ 
and 112∘ 54′ east. Besides, the Paracels are archipelagoes 
which are subdivided into the amphrite and the crescent 
group. The largest of them is Woody Island which is 
about 1.8 km long and 1.1 -1.2 km wide. Aside these two 
groups, the archipelagoes contain over 30 islets, sand 
banks or reefs and the area is rich in phosphate deposits 
(Tonnesson, 2002).  Scarborough Shoal is about 198 km 
west of Subic Bay. The shoal’s highest point is south rock 
and it measures 1.8m above water during high tide. The 
shoal and its surrounding area are rich fishing grounds. 
The atolls’ lagoon provide some protection for fishing 
boats during harsh weather which is why it is highly 
contested by Philippines and China as they are located in 
the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Philippines (Zou, 
1999). The Macclesfield Bank is one of the largest atolls 
in the world even though it is completely submerged 
without any emergent cays or islets. It lies east of the 
Paracels, southwest of the Pratas and north of the 
Spratlys. 
 
South China Sea: Which Disputant Claims Which? 
The Philippines’ claims are based on historical discovery 
and terra nullius, a term used by Philippines meaning that 
following the forfeiture of the Spratlys by Japan after the 
World War II, the area was left unoccupied and without 
devolution to any other state. This assertion is 
corroborated by Leszek Buszynski (2010:2) when he 
states that without an occupant, the way was open for 
Philippine adventurer Thomas Cloma to claim Kalayaan 
or “Freedomland” for the Philippines in May 1956. 
Cloma’s declaration embraced an area that extended from 
Palavan and included 53 features. It was supported by 
Philippine’s Foreign Secretary, Carlos Garcia who in 
December 1956 issued the Garcia Declaration which 
treated the area in Cloma’s claim as terra nullius” 
To further consolidate its claims, Philippines in 2009 
passed the baseline laws to identify its archipelagic 
baselines. Beyond this, it petitioned China before 
International Tribunal in 2013 where it obtained widely 
expected favourable judgement against China in 2016. 
Another persistent claimant is Vietnam. Vietnam’s claims 
are both of the Spratlys and Paracels which it bases on 
historical discovery, historical occupation and continental 
shelf principle. It maintains that since 17th century when 
these islands were not under any state’s control, it 
maintained effective, continuous and peaceful control 
over them. To solidify its claims, Vietnam released two 
white papers between 1979 and 1982 containing historical 
evidence. These evidential papers spurred it to further 
increase its occupations of the Spratlys in 1989 to 21 
islets and reefs (Dzurek, 1996). More so, being that China 
is Vietnam’s greatest rival in South China Sea, Vietnam 
has sought ways to define its claims within the provisions 
of the UNCLOS in that beyond ratification of UNCLOS 
in 1994, it also filed a joint claim with Malaysia to the 
UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in 
2009 claiming an area in the South China Sea beyond 
their 200 nautical miles exclusive economic zone, a move 
that inspired Vietnam to further occupy 27 islands 
(Monique, 2000). 
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Taiwan on its part has long insisted on becoming the only 
legitimate government of China. Thus, like China, Taiwan 
bases its claims on historical ties and that it was the first 
to establish a presence in the Spratlys (Joyner, 1999). 
Taiwan does not only claim the Spratlys but also all the 
islands in the South China Sea (Valencia, et al, 1999) and 
securing these islands would to a large extent cement its 
statehood, national boundaries, territorial claims and 
nationalism (Emmers, 2000). It has for four decades 
maintained control over Itu Aba, the largest island in the 
Spratlys. 
China, just like Vietnam and Taiwan, bases its claims on 
historical discovery and occupation, further claiming that 
the sovereignty over the waters of the South China Sea 
has been known from time immemorial (Gia and Jia, 
2013) dating back to Sung Dynasty around 12th century 
and Qing Dynasty in the 18th century (Kurlantzick, 2007). 
Further, China’s claims encapsulate all the islands in the 
South China Sea which it released in its official map 
containing nine-dash line formerly eleven separate 
segmented lines which it has failed to clarify. Such claims 
to all the islands spur China to aggressiveness and 
assertiveness as it fights to maintain such claims by 
building artificial islands and structures on the occupied 
islands. It is these aggressiveness and assertiveness that 
thwarts ASEAN unity as ASEAN becomes wary of how 
best to deal with China without being seen by its 
members to have taken sides. Even in the face of the 
Tribunal’s declaration of China’s occupation as illegal, 
there is still growing fears that China might increase the 
tempo of its assertiveness. 
 
Map.1: showing Disputants’ claims and China’s nine-dash lines 
 
Source: Leszek, 2011 
 
What Brunei actually claims is marred with controversy. 
While some scholars like Ji (1992) argue that Brunei’s 
claims a continental shelf and exclusive economic zone, 
others like Bautista (2007) argue that Brunei claims two 
reefs — Louisa Reef, which is also claimed by Malaysia 
and Rifleman Bank. Besides, it is only Brunei that does 
not occupy any island or maintain any military presence. 
Malaysia, which claims 12 islands in the Spratlys bases 
its claims on continental shelf principle which is rooted in 
the 1958 Geneva Convention regarding to territorial 
waters and continental shelf boundaries (Dyke, et al, 
1993). Evidences show that Malaysia has developed 
structures in its occupied islands including the 
establishment of a garrison on Layang Island and the 
development of Swallow Reef into a resort (Bautista, 
2007). Of all the  
Table.1: Showing Number of Occupations and Estimated Troops in SCS 
Parties Basis Claims Spratly  
Islands 
Paracel  
Islands 
Number of islands 
Occupied 
Estimated 
 number of 
 troops 
China Historical All     All All 8 islands and reefs; several 
helicopter  pads 
325 
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Brunei Legal Portions     1  No claim No occupation No military 
 presence 
Malaysia Legal Portions    12  No claim 6 islands, one with 60 meter 
runway 
70 
Philippin
es 
Legal/ 
historical 
Portions    8 No claim 8 islands, one with 300 meter 
runway 
480 
Vietnam Historical All    All All 27 islands and reefs, one with 
600 meter runway 
600 
Taiwan historical All    All All 1 island with Helicopter pads;  
 plans for runway 
100 
Source: Baker and Wiencek (2002)  
 
claimants in South China Sea, only China and Taiwan are 
non- South East Asian claimants, a development that 
makes China suspect any ASEAN’s move hence, its 
refusal for any consensus to be reached. 
 
South China Sea: What is at Stake? 
South China Sea is home to the world’s richest marine 
resources, contributing 12 percent of the total marine 
global production (Edgardo, 2000). These marine 
resources range from fisheries, scads, mackerels, tunas to 
shrimps (Coulter, 1996). With the abundance of these 
marine lives, it is understandable why South China Sea 
continues to be a hotspot to the claimants which need 
these marine lives for domestic consumption and foreign 
exchange earnings. As Cronin (2012) captures it that food 
protein constitutes more than 22 percent of Asian diet 
which is higher than global average of 16 percent. 
Besides marine resources, keeping the sea lanes of 
communications open are strategically important to the 
claimants. The Straits of Mallaca, Lombok and Sunda 
connect Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Indian Ocean 
and the Pacific Ocean; choke points that allow littoral 
states to freely navigate through the sea for commercial 
and military purposes (Joyner, 1999). It is the sea’s 
interconnectivity that fuels the dispute as both claimants 
and non-claimants have interests in freedom of 
navigation. 
South China Sea also presents a viable option through 
which the claimants’ governments especially China, 
Vietnam and Philippines would consolidate their 
legitimacy in the face of their demanding populations. As 
Lynn Kuok who interviewed one of the high-ranked civil 
servants in China but from non-claimant state reports that 
“in the past, few people in China would have known 
about nine-dash line, now it is printed on maps and 
passports. Giving up their claims in respect of the nine-
dash line would be like giving up what their ancestors had 
handed them” (Kuok, 2014:11). Thus, in the eyes of the 
claimants’ populations, surrendering any part or whole of 
the South China Sea would be conceived as a mark of 
weakness and ineffectiveness of the government which 
might cost the government of its mandate. 
Large deposits of hydrocarbon in the sea further raises the 
tension and the style of the dispute. Though, there have 
been conflicting estimates of the actual hydrocarbon in 
the sea, the Chinese Ministry of Geology and Mineral 
Resources estimated in 1980s that the sea contained about 
130 billion barrels of oil — an amount greater than the oil 
reserves in Europe and Latin America (Klare, 2001). On 
the other hand, United States Energy Information 
Administration in 2013 estimated that there could be 
approximately 11 billion barrels of oil reserves and 190 
trillion cubic feet of natural gas in the South China Sea as 
contained in table two below. 
 
Table.2: South China Sea Estimated Proved and 
Probable Reserves 
Country Crude oil and 
liquids reserves 
(billion barrels) 
Natural gas 
reserves 
(billion cubit 
feet) 
Brunei 1.5 15 
China 1.3 15 
Indonesia 0.3 55 
Malaysia 5.0 80 
Philippines 0.2 4 
Taiwan - - 
Thailand - 1 
Vietnam 3.0 20 
Total 11.2 190 
Source: USEIA (2013) 
Each of these claimants needs the oil for both domestic 
consumption and foreign exchange earnings. As BP 
Energy Outlook 2016 forecasts that global GDP is 
expected to more than double driven by strong growth in 
emerging Asia; in which case, China and India will 
account for almost half of the increase in the global GDP 
which means energy consumption will increase by 34 
percent between 2014 and 2035 (BP, 2016). Besides, 
ASEAN’s oil needs and dependency is on steady rise 
since 1993 (Sovacool, et al, 2011). 
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ASEAN internal disjoint: the first phase of ASEAN 
divide 
ASEAN at its formative years was seen as a landmark 
achievement in preserving and maintaining regional 
stability and cooperation. By 1967, at its incipience, five 
founding members pledged their support on the principles 
that would guide them as well as the myriads of 
objectives which the body set to accomplish: promoting 
mutual respect for the sovereignty of the member states, 
territorial integrity and national cohesion or identity for 
all member states. Going forward, ASEAN was seen as 
the world’s most successful and developed regional 
grouping, a landmark that other regions would strive to 
emulate. With these set of objectives described as 
“ASEAN Way”, founding members and other members 
that would later join the body felt protected and 
incubated; feelings that would translate into unique 
oneness as against individualism. First, these positive 
feelings led to the construction of mutual trust among its 
members that culminated into economic interdependence 
and growth, growth rate that catapulted some of its 
members to the taxonomy of “Asian Tigers”. Second, 
beyond economic viability, ASEAN succeeded in erecting 
frameworks aimed at solidifying such economic buoyancy 
and its principles. The ASEAN plus 3 arrangement 
(arrangement that comprises China, Japan and South 
Korea for cooperation); the East Asia Summit (another 
milestone arrangement that converges ASEAN plus 3 
countries with India, Australia, New Zealand, Russia and 
the United States), the Chiang Mai Initiative (a 
framework for currency swap between ASEAN plus 3), 
the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(RCEP) that brings together states in Asian-Pacific 
Region under the canopy of free trade area) and ASEAN 
regional Forum (a security framework that invites East 
Asian States and other non-regional states. It is within 
these laudable achievements that ASEAN became an 
epitome other regional groupings sought to envy. 
However, here comes a South China Sea dispute that 
leaves ASEAN toothless and in disarray. As David 
Rosenberg observes that ASEAN serves as a useful forum 
for promoting economic growth, political stability and 
social and cultural exchange in the region, however, it is 
sometimes subject to a “lowest-common-denominator 
syndrome, whereby policies are watered down to satisfy 
the wishes of the members with conflicting interests 
(Rosenberg, 1999). The once-viable organization now 
becomes a Hollywood movie which both people inside 
and outside a cinema watch with suspense and to a large 
extent with pity as to how a particular actor or protagonist 
would overcome a particular hurdle or impasse. 
Certainly, there are obvious reasons why ASEAN renege 
and the first is what this paper terms “ASEAN internal 
disjoint”, a phrase that would mean the internal 
disagreement among ASEAN members. Perhaps, 
interrogative questions that need to be asked are these: 
Why ASEAN internal disjoint? What might be 
responsible? And to what extent has the internal disjoint 
affected ASEAN’s viability and masculinity? The first 
and second interrogatives are unit question which shall be 
treated alike. One thing is clear: ASEAN’s internal 
disjoint is caused by two factors — divergent strategic 
interests of the South East Asian members and the 
position of China in the region. 
 
Divergent strategic interests of ASEAN members 
As properly captured elsewhere in this paper, the 
divergence and variance of the interests of both ASEAN 
claimants and non-claimants in South China Sea further 
castrates ASEAN as a body. Rodolfo Severino (2010:37) 
posits that,  
Vietnam needs its footholds in the South China 
Sea to avoid being practically surrounded by 
Chinese power, with which it was in conflict for 
many centuries. The Philippines feels compelled 
to extend its zone of jurisdiction and 
responsibility westwards, having been invaded 
by the Japanese from that direction at the start of 
the pacific war. A vast area of the South China 
Sea both separates West East Malaysia and 
connects them to each other. Brunei Darussalam 
has to ensure for itself the resources in its 
claimed exclusive zone and continental shelf, 
which overlap with other claims. 
Likewise, Jakarta has an interest in making sure that the 
rich gas resources of the Natuna Group of islands are 
under its exclusive authority and for its exclusive 
authority (Severino, 2010). Aside these interests, each of 
the ASEAN claimants has overlapping claims which they 
are yet to resolve in order to forge a common bond 
against their common rival — China (Valencia, 2012). 
Though these overlapping claims have not been 
escalatory as they have with China, the overlapping 
claims with their attendant strategic significance have 
resulted into subjective ways in which the claimants 
interpret international law (UNCLOS) and history. 
Furthermore, what constitutes peace and stability now 
depends on the claimant’s interpretation in so far as it 
captures the claimant’s interest. As worrisome as these 
developments are, ASEAN as a unit is divorced with 
serious pressure on how to reconcile these internal 
differences before facing a great rival in China. 
 
Position of China in the region 
No state or power has vehemently challenged ASEAN’s 
centrality like China, a situation that leaves ASEAN with 
nightmare on how to engage China. First, China’s nine-
dash line claims which it has failed to clarify only to 
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assert that it has “indisputable sovereignty over the 
islands in the South China Sea and adjacent waters, and 
enjoys rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as 
well as the seabed and subsoil thereof” (Franckx and 
Benatar, 2011:213) leaves other claimants in limbo and 
draws states like Indonesia that otherwise would have 
nothing to do with South China Sea into the conflict. 
Second, China’s land reclamations and fortifications 
further trouble not only other claimants but ASEAN 
generally. Whereas China has argued that they are for 
peaceful purposes, the pictures of the fortifications and 
structures clearly testify that China is building a military 
zone capable of cohabiting with its planned Air Defense 
Identification Zone typical of the one it mounted in 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, another territorial dispute 
between it and Japan. Third, China’s military power 
which rises conterminously as its economy raises further 
leave ASEAN with worries. Though, China has not used 
tangible force against any claimant, its sheer size of 
capabilities emboldens it to the point of aggressiveness, at 
least the Mischief Reef and Scarborough incidents are 
undeniable facts of China’s confrontations coupled with 
its navy modernization that is capable of confronting not 
only the regional states but outside powers also (as table 
below clearly indicates), a development that has led to 
retaliatory  
 
Table.3: Size of the PLAN in 2015 
Names of capabilities      Total 
Aircraft Carriers 1 
Destroyers 21 
Frigates 52 
Corvettes 15 
Tank Landing Ships/ 
Amphibious Transport Dock 
29 
Medium Landing Ships 28 
Diesel Attack Submarines 53 
Nuclear Attack Submarines 5 
Coastal Patrol (Missile) 86 
Source:  Cordesman, et al, 2015 
 
modernization programmes by ASEAN states. As SIPRI 
explained that defense spending in Southeast Asia rose to 
5 percent between 2012 and 2013, higher than in East 
Asia (4.7 perent) and Asia and Oceania as a whole (3.6 
percent) in Storey (2015). Further, between 2010 and 
2014, all Southeast Asian states increased their defense 
spending: Vietnam (59.1 percent), Philippines (35 
percent), Malaysia (27.6 percent), Brunei (35 percent), 
Indonesia (50.6 percent), Singapore (21.4 percent) and 
Thailand (15.5 percent) in Storey (2015: 75). The 
implications of these retaliatory moves by ASEAN states 
are that developmental projects are sacrificed for 
capability acquisitions and modernizations and may 
embolden ASEAN states especially Vietnam and 
Philippines into confronting China, a situation that would 
further undermine an already deteriorating peace in the 
region. 
Fourth, the complex economic interdependence between 
ASEAN member states and China further divides 
ASEAN. As US-China Economic and Security review 
Commission (2013) shows that the majority (78.8 
percent) of ASEAN’s trade in 2013 was with outside 
bloc… China was the largest individual partner (14 
percent) share of ASEAN trade while U.S was the fourth 
largest (8.2 percent) share.  
 
Table.4: showing China’s Bilateral Trade with ASEAN Countries (US$million) in 2013 
                      US$million Share of ASEAN (%) 
1998 2003 2008 2013 1998 2003 2008 2013 
ASEAN 
Total 
Exports 10,919 30,935 114,139 244,133 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Imports 12,589 47,350 117,012 199,402 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Balance (1,670) (16,415) (2,873) 44,731 100% 100% 100% 100% 
                                                             High-Income 
Brunei 
 
Exports 560 34 130 1,704 5.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.7% 
Imports 0 311 83 87 0.0% 0.7% 0.1% 0.0% 
Balance 560 (277) 47 1,627     
Singapore Exports 3,901 8,873 32,325 45,886 35.7% 28.7% 28.3% 18.8% 
Imports 4,226 10,486 20,092 29,969 33.6% 22.1% 17.2% 15.0% 
Balance (323) (1,613) 12,233 15,918     
                                                           Middle-Income 
Indonesia Exports 1,172 4,482 17,210 36,947 10.7% 14.5% 15.1% 15.1% 
Imports 2,462 5,754 14,387 31,479 19.6% 12.2% 12.3% 15.8% 
Balance (1,290) (1,272) 2,823 5,469     
Malaysia Exports 1,594 6,142 21,383 45,941 14.6% 19.9% 18.7% 18.8% 
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Imports 2,675 13,998 32,131 60,068 21.2% 29.6% 27.5% 30.1% 
Balance (1,080) (7,856) (10, 748) (14,128)     
Thailand Exports 1,170 3,829 15,521 32,738 10.7% 12.4% 13.6% 13.4% 
Imports 2,423 8,829 25,636 38,518 19.2% 18.6% 21.9% 19.3% 
Balance (1,253) (5,000) (10,116) (5,780)     
Philippines Exports 1,499 3,094 9,088 19,836 13.7% 10.0% 8.0% 8.1% 
Imports 517 6,309 19,508 18,205 4.1% 13.3% 16.7% 9.1% 
Balance 982 (3,215) (10,420) 1,631     
                                                           Low-Income 
Burma Exports n.a 908 1,979 7,349 n.a 2.9% 1.7% 3.0% 
 Imports n.a 170 645 2,810 n.a. 0.4% 0.6% 1.4% 
 Balance n.a 738 1,335 4,540     
Cambodia Exports n.a 295 1,095 3,411 n.a 1.0% 1.0% 1.4% 
Imports n.a 26 39 361 n.a 0.1% 0.0% 0.2% 
Balance n.a 268 1,056 3,050     
Laos Exports n.a 98 268 1,721 n.a 0.3% 0.2% 0.7% 
Imports n.a 11 149 1,021 n.a 0.0% 0.1% 0.5% 
Balance n.a 87 119 701     
Vietnam 
 
Exports 1,024 3,180 15,139 48,599 9.4% 10.3% 13.3% 19.9% 
Imports 217 1,455 4,343 16,886 1.7% 3.1% 3.7% 8.5% 
Balance 806 1,725 10,797 31,714     
Source: US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (US-China ESRC, 2015) 
 
The implication of this is that some ASEAN member 
states which are highly dependent on China’s trade 
relations for survival tend to bend toward China thus 
making consensus a difficult task. It also emboldens 
China to freely dictate its choices and interests to 
ASEAN, an indication of is favoured bilateralism against 
multilateralism. 
In an emergency meeting held by ASEAN in May 2012 to 
discuss the Scarborough standoff, Cambodia blocked the 
organization from releasing a document aimed at 
advocating restraints between China and Philippines. 
Perhaps, most worrisome was the July 2012 Foreign 
Ministers meeting in Phnom Pehn where ASEAN failed 
to produce a joint communiqué for the first time since its 
birth in 1967 (Kim, 2015; Valencia, 2012; International 
Crisis Group, 2012), a situation that left Luke Hunt in 
2014 to declare that 
Cambodia’s dependence on Chinese aid and 
investment — worth more than 11 billion dollars 
during the last two decades and Cambodia’s 
position as a party not directly involved in the 
territorial disputes have, led Phnom Pehn to 
support Chinese claims, inadvertently 
strengthening Beijing’s position in territorial 
matters by publicly splitting ASEAN and making 
the organization “a dysfunctional trading bloc 
incapable of negotiating for itself” in (Kim, 
2015:124). 
Likewise, on the crafting of the Code of Conduct (COC), 
there was bitter division among ASEAN member states 
whether or not to include a dispute resolution mechanism 
or perhaps to establish a different forum and an 
administrative plan that would oversee its 
implementation, an internal sabotage that left only 
Philippines standing when it moved to petition China to 
International Tribunal in 2013. Such intransigence due to 
trade interdependence could also be seen on the sides of 
Brunei and Malaysia in that when Chinese warships 
hopped over James Shoal which attracted wide 
condemnations, Malaysia claimed that the Chinese ships 
did not violate international law while Brunei failed to 
attend “talks among four Southeast Asian nations with 
claims in the South China Sea”, promoted by the 
Philippines, claiming that it would not be in Brunei’s 
“national interest to do so” (Kim, 2015:125).  
These shows of imperviousness and intransigence on the 
side of ASEAN member states make Ian Storey to 
summarize that “within ASEAN there is group of four 
versus the group of six. The former includes non-
claimants — Thailand, Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia, 
the latter two being economically highly dependent on 
China. The group of six include claimants and 
stakeholders. Among them, Vietnam and Philippines see 
China as a threat to national security; Malaysia and 
Brunei downplay disputes with China; non-claimants 
Singapore and Indonesia are concerned about nine-dash 
line and see maritime stability as a vital national interest. 
With such diverse interests and opinions, moving beyond 
on agreement on a basic stance is difficult” in 
(International Crisis Group, 2015:27). Certainly, with 
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these dissensions in ASEAN, “ASEAN Way” has given 
way for “ASEAN Divide”, a first dilemma starring at 
ASEAN as a body for a durable fix so that it can recapture 
itself as a viable regional grouping capable enough of 
stopping China’s use of salami-slicing strategy which 
gradually emboldens its claims and gradually drowns the 
claims of others. 
 
Incursion of U.S in South China Sea: the second phase 
of ASEAN divide 
China’s bourgeoning economy and military power 
continue to pose a serious nightmare to ASEAN. 
Irrespective of modernization programme by ASEAN 
member states, which is in a way to deter China and in 
another way to counter China if it strikes, China continues 
to be seen as biblical Goliath who caused Israel their 
peace save the timely intervention of David. Besides, not 
only has the modernization pose serious threat to ASEAN 
unity but it also accentuates economic haemorrhage faced 
by ASEAN member states as funds meant for 
development is diverted for capability acquisitions and 
modernization. 
U.S is in South China Sea for two reasons — protection 
of its core interest and its treaty allies in the region. 
Again, China is at the centre of these reasons in that 
without China’s nature of claim which is projected with 
aggressiveness and greater activism, U.S and perhaps 
other outside powers may not see reasons to meddle in the 
region. Meanwhile, such incursion by U.S has further 
implicated ASEAN and complicated its nightmare as each 
ASEAN member continues to interpret U.S presence 
based on the state’s national interest and relation with 
China. As Kim rightly observes that the “escalating South 
China Sea disputes have continued to expose conflicting 
interests and divisions among ASEAN members and their 
lack of cohesive strategic vision for the future. In 
particular, their diverging perspectives on how best to 
handle Beijing’s growing assertiveness have increased the 
potential for them to be at the mercy of great power 
rivalry between China and United States for regional 
influence and to be caught in the middle of conflict 
between the two in the future, possibly forcing them to 
take sides” (Kim, 2015:129). 
United States has vital interests in the South China Sea. 
First, it is bent on maintaining freedom of navigation in 
the region in order to consolidate its position as a world 
police (Rustandi, 2016; Bader, et al, 2014; Pedrozo, 
2016). Beyond ensuring freedom of navigation in the 
regional waters, U.S also has interests in the vital 
resources of the South China Sea as well as ensuring that 
its allies in the region are protected (Salil, 2012:19). 
Valencia asserts that “U.S wants to maintain the existing 
status quo in Southeast Asia — a status quo in which it is 
the dominant actor and patron. This is essentially a 
continuation of its cold war policy and posture in the 
region — a substantial forward deployed military 
presence and hub-and-spoke alliance structure” (Valencia, 
2014:6). Accordingly, it is these interests of ensuring free 
lanes of communication and protection of its allies that 
the region now turns into “a political church” where 
different powers — Japan, Australia, South Korea and 
India which are in one hand allies to U.S and Russia and 
China congregate for a show of power and influence, a 
situation that worries Erik Beukel when he claims that 
“not only Japan and other regional powers, but also 
United States as the global super power, are closely 
watching China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea; 
whilst they maintain strict neutrality on the sovereignty 
substance of the disputes, any threat to free shipping by 
littoral countries, terrorists, or pirates will be met with a 
strong reaction, not only from America, but also from 
Japan” (Beukel, 2010:9). 
Vietnam and Philippines are key allies of United States in 
Southeast Asia including Indonesia. The former, which 
are more confrontational with China invited U.S for 
rebalancing against China and have further strengthened 
their ties with U.S. This assertion is corroborated by Kim 
when he declares that “United States has strengthened its 
strategic relations with countries in the Asia-Pacific 
including key members of ASEAN, such as Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam. The frequency of 
joint military exercises between and among the United 
States and those countries in the region has increased in 
conjunction with Washington’s strategic rebalancing to 
Asia” (Kim, 2015:130). As true as Kim’s declaration 
seems, other ASEAN members like Brunei, Malaysia, 
Laos, Cambodia and others which are more of Chinese 
allies have continued to view U.S incursion as 
destabilizing. Indonesia, for instance, which has so far 
demonstrated a lead role as a pacifier in the dispute has 
also vehemently opposed U.S presence in the region 
(Buszynski, 2012; International Crisis Group. 2012). This 
second ASEAN divide as a result of U.S presence in the 
dispute is the most pitiable. 
China has outrightly objected to outside power 
intervention as it fears such involvement would mean 
internationalizing the dispute, a fear that makes it to 
favour bilateralism as against multilateralism and leads it 
into deeper confrontation with U.S. In 2001, a Chinese Jet 
intercepted America’s navy which resulted in Chinese 
pilot’s death and detention of 24 American crew members 
for 11 days after their plane made an emergency landing 
in Hainan. Further, in 2009, both Chinese vessels and U.S 
surveillance ship, “the Impeccable” clashed which China 
blamed on U.S for intruding into its jurisdiction. These 
confrontations further heightened the tension in the region 
and exposed ASEAN’s weakness. ASEAN second 
nightmare is how to reconcile the divergent opinions and 
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feelings its members have on U.S incursion in the region. 
Allowing U.S in the region will deter China and reduce its 
aggressiveness but will affect the economic 
interdependence between China and ASEAN members. 
Conversely, prohibiting U.S involvement would translate 
into Chinese- continued aggressiveness and flourishing 
economic interdependence as far as ASEAN does not 
rock the boat. 
 
II. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
South China Sea has become a global hotspot where two 
major powers in China and U.S converge with their stakes 
in sight. While U.S advocates for freedom of navigation 
as contained in the UNCLOS which would further 
guarantee its global dominance and the spread of its 
protective wings on its allies in Southeast Asia, China 
sees the sea as vital not only for its quest for regional 
consolidation but also for global recognition and 
dominance as a global power, a situation that pits U.S 
realism and Chinese realism together in a complex and 
nuanced regional dispute. Fisheries, hydrocarbons, 
nationalism and quest for freedom of navigation have 
been the source of rising tension n the region as claimants 
remain unyielding and uncompromising to any plan 
aimed at resolving the dispute.  
All these complexities which the dispute has assumed 
divide a once-viable regional grouping in ASEAN, a 
divide that is caused by internal incoherence among 
ASEAN members and U.S presence in the region with 
China being at the centre of the divide. Furthermore, as a 
result of complex economic interdependence between 
China and ASEAN, a nightmare is further prolonged as 
ASEAN searches for the best way to engage China 
without compromising such economic interdependence. 
Funny enough, Vietnam and Philippines have indicated 
interests to risk such interdependence while some other 
ASEAN members are not ready for such regrettable risk, 
an unpalatable situation that hinders ASEAN from 
reaching a consensus on how best to deal with the dispute 
without compromising the bond that unites the group. As 
observes by Kim, “overall, underneath ASEAN’s veneer 
of diplomatic unity, ASEAN diplomacy amid the China 
threat has shown more continuities than changes in terms 
of failing to present a united front in the maritime disputes 
to convince China to exercise self-restraint in the South 
China Sea” (Kim, 2015:129). 
Beyond having Chinese nightmare, ASEAN has another 
nightmare on how to deal with U.S presence in the region. 
There is a second divide among ASEAN members 
whether U.S should be allowed to rebalance against China 
or be asked to hold its peace. 
However, as divided as ASEAN might be at the moment, 
world including China and U.S believe that ASEAN is 
still the lynchpin to Southeast Asia’s stability and 
masculinity, a protagonist capable of leading and 
resolving the dispute. Thus, there is need for ASEAN to 
reinvent its lost aura by heeding to these number of 
recommendations adumbrated below 
First, though Southeast Asian Claimants have made 
positive moves towards making their claims come to 
terms with the principles of UNCOS, there is every need 
for them to properly clarify which of the land features in 
the South China Sea could be attributed to island, rock or 
low-tide elevation. Article 121(3) of UNCLOS states that 
rocks that cannot sustain human habitation or economic 
life of their own shall have no maritime zone. Whereas 
islands are entitled to maritime zones, low-tide elevations 
are not islands and thus not entitled to any maritime zone. 
ASEAN needs to forge a common bond and show 
resilience in the midst of great power intrusion. 
Second, ASEAN needs to have a second look at its 
charter. The idea of “non-interference” into member 
state’s affairs and total “consensus” before any move in 
plan is made have waned in the face of challenging 
contemporary global politics. Non-interference in a way 
affects ASEAN’s ability to dictate how the dispute should 
be resolved. Likewise, reaching a consensus before any 
step could be taken in any issue is not only outdated but 
spoon feeding. In a world of realism where the national 
interest of any sate is paramount, reaching a consensus 
before major step is taken on issue may be counter-
productive. This is what is playing out among ASEAN 
members. In as much as member states have divergent 
views on how to relate with the major powers in the 
dispute, waiting for a consensus to be reached may further 
destabilize the region. Thus, there is need for these 
provisions to be oiled, refined and redefined to meet the 
politics playing out each day in the region. 
Third, it is high time ASEAN came to the understanding 
of the fact that China needs ASEAN just as ASEAN 
needs China. ASEAN remains indispensable to China as 
it cannot globally dominate in isolation. Thus, the fear by 
some of the ASEAN members that their trade relations 
with China may be affected if ASEAN presses to resolve 
the dispute in its best way is unfounded. To this fact, 
codes and forum already established to reduce the tension 
or resolve the dispute should be given some bites. 
There is no doubting the roles ASEAN has played in the 
dispute like the establishment of Code of Conduct (COC) 
in 1992 and Declaration of Conduct of Parties (DOC) in 
2002. But, these codes are rule-based without 
enforcement mechanisms. Perhaps, before setting the tone 
for enforcement, there is a need to clarify some provisions 
in the DOC. For example, whether the DOC’s call to 
exercise “self-restraint” and prohibit “inhabiting on the 
presently uninhabited” land features would include new 
construction or fortification or improvement on facilities 
already built in any occupied territory. More so, 
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clarification has to be made on how the DOC’s provision 
for “freedom of navigation on and over flight” is to be 
reconciled with China’s claim to “indisputable 
sovereignty” over the entire South China Sea. It is when 
these clarifications are done that implementation and 
enforcement of the code would be ripe. 
Lastly, ASEAN would need to accommodate U.S in the 
region not as a competitor with China but as a benign role 
player capable of deterring China with its presence. 
Though competition between the two may not stop 
completely, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and East 
Asia Summit (EAS) that congregate both ASEAN and 
non-ASEAN members including Japan, China and United 
States should be encouraged and strengthened. To 
minimize mistrust between China - ASEAN and China – 
U.S, Indonesia which is seen as an honest broker or 
mediator in the dispute by both China and U.S should be 
encouraged to continue to play such role in any ARF and 
EAS meetings 
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